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The Treaty of Rome' established the European Economic
Community. In its Preamble and text,2 this Treaty seeks to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development
of economic activities and to establish the institution of a system
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1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1973 Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities 163 (Office for official publications of the European
Communities). Signatories of the Treaty were the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Lux-
embourg, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the "Member States of the European
Communities"). By the Treaty Between the Member States of the European Communi-
ties, the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Den-
mark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic
Energy Community, 1973 Treaties establishing the European Communities 871 (Office for
official publications of the European Communities), the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland,
the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
became members of the European Community. The Kingdom of Norway never ratified
the agreement.
2. The Treaty of Rome, art. 2 provides:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
The Treaty of Rome, art. 3(f) provides:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out
therein
the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market
is not distorted . . ..
1973 Treaties establishing the European Communities 179-80 (Office for official publica-
tions of the European Communities) [hereinafter cited as Treaties].
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ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted.
As observed by Elles,3 "the field of competition, which relates to
the breaking down of trade barriers erected by restrictive trading
practices . .. , is near the very heart of the Common Market
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market: all agreements between undertakings...
and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market . .. .4
The Court of Justice of the European Communities,5 the Council
of the European Communities,6 and the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities7 all develop the law under Article 85(1). The
3. N. ELLES, COMMUNITY LAW THROUGH THE CASES 6 (1973).
Useful secondary sources on Community law and antitrust include: W. ALEXANDER,
THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (1973); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE
EEC (1973); R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW - AMERICAN, GERMAN AND
COMMON MARKET LAWS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (No. 26 of COLLECTION SCIENTIFIQUE
de la Facultb de droit de l'Universit6 de Liege 1967); A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY LAW (1973); J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST -
OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (1970); Zaphirou, Rule of Reason and Double Jeopardy in Euro-
pean Antitrust Law, 6 TEX. INT'L L. F. 1 (1970).
4. Treaties at 245.
5. The composition, jurisdiction, and powers of the Court of Justice are set forth in
the Treaty of Rome, arts. 164-188, Treaties at 297-305. Generally, the Court of Justice
reviews the legality of acts of the Council of the European Communities and of the Com-
mission of the European Communities other than recommendations or opinions. For this
purpose, it has jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the
Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, or infringement of the Treaty of Rome or of any rule of law relating to its
application, art. 173, Id. at 300.
6. The role, powers and duties of the Council are set forth in the Treaty of Rome,
arts. 145-153, Treaties at 293-95.
Article 145 provides:
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council shall,
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
-ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States:
-have power to take decisions.
7. The Treaty of Rome, art. 155 provides:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market,
the Commission shall:
-ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institu-
tions pursuant thereto are applied;
-formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;
-have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken
by the Council and by the Assembly in the manner provided for in this Treaty;
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Court of Justice of the European Communities is the final author-
ity on the meaning and purposes of Article 85(1). The Council and
the Commission have authority to issue regulations implement-
ing Article 85(1) and authority to exempt certain types of agree-
ments from the prohibitions contained in Article 85(1).1 The
Commission hears cases arising under Article 85(1) and makes
decisions which are appealable to the Court of Justice. When a
case is presented to the Court, the Advocate-General' is bound to
make independent arguments to the Court. Under this structure,
the Court of Justice makes final decisions on the case before it.
These final decisions, however, are in contrast with the opinions
which the Court can issue under the referral provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. 0 In a referral case, a national court asks the
Court of Justice to interpret an Article of the Treaty. In this
context, the Court does not apply the Article to the case in the
sense of deciding the question. Instead, the Court gives an inter-
pretation binding upon the national court. Through both medi-
-exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the
rules laid down by the latter.
Treaties at 296.
8. The Treaty of Rome, arts. 189-192, Treaties at 305-06.
Article 189 provides in part:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take deci-
sions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States.
The Council, at this time, has authority, when it unanimously acts on a proposal from
the Commission and after it consults with the Assembly of the European Communities
(an advisory and supervisory body, art. 137) to adopt "any appropriate regulations ...
to give effect to the principle set out in Article 85. ... The Treaty of Rome, art. 87(1),
Treaties at 247.
9. The Treaty of Rome, art. 166 provides, in part:
The Court of Justice shall be assisted by four Advocates-General.
It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality
and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought
before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court . ...
Treaties at 298.
10. The Treaty of Rome, art. 177 provides, in part:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concern-
ing:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon.
Treaties at 301-02.
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ums, the Court has developed a rule of reason, in the field of
exclusive distributorship agreements, under Article 85(1).
By the terms of Article 85(1), agreements "which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention. . . of competition" are prohibited and, by
the terms of Article 85(2), are declared void." In the six cases,
decided under Article 85(1) by the Court of Justice, which in-
volved vertical distributorship'2 and exclusive territory agree-
ments,'3 the Court of Justice has taken strong steps toward the
development of its own rule of reason. Presently before the Court
of Justice are several cases' 4 that will be decided against this
backdrop.
The development of the Court's rule of reason occurs in a
field in which various policy choices among economic objectives
compete for implementation. In terms of benefits, an agreement
that insulates a territory enables a manufacturing enterprise to
enter a new market. Consumers benefit because there are more
choices between products of different manufacturers.' 5 On the
retail level, however, once the product is established and differen-
tiated, that is, made distinct by various means such as advertis-
ing, it assumes a product market of its own.'" This differentiation
11. The Treaty of Rome, art. 85(2) provides:
Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be auto-
matically void.
Treaties at 245.
12. A vertical agreement is one between two parties at different stages in the mar-
keting process, e.g., a manufacturer agrees with a retailer. See generally P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 338 (1967); COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND
RELATED PROBLEMS OF LICENSING IN THE LAW OF THE EEC COUNTRIES AND OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 105, 108 (Gerven & Lukoff, eds., 1970); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION
LAW OF THE EEC 130-32 (1973).
13. In an exclusive territory agreement, a manufacturer will allot a specific territory
to each of several dealers. No dealer may sell the product to a person who does not reside
in his territory. A less insulating device than the exclusive territory agreement is an
agreement of primary responsibility. In this type of agreement, the producer assigns a
specific territory to each of several dealers, but they are at liberty to sell to persons not
residing within their area. See generally Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution, 30 U. CH.
L. REV. 286 (1963); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
75 HARv. L. REV. 795 (1962).
14. E.g., Commercial Solvents Decision by the Commission, 12 C.M.L.R. D65
(1973); Sugar Cartel Decision by the Commission, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9570 (1973).
In addition to hearing cases, the Commission can initiate investigations and has
chosen exclusive distributorship agreements as the current target, Financial Times, Jan.
31, 1973, at 7, col. 1; Financial Times, Mar. 15, 1973, at 6, col. 1. See generally D. Gross,
Thirty Firms Face Fines by EEC Commission, The Times (London), Dec. 5, 1972, at 19,
col. 7; The Times (London), Mar. 19, 1973, at 20, col. 1.
15. See Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
16. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 134-35 (1967). See C.J.C.E. 9 juillet 1969 (V6lk
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leads to a lack of consumer choice. In such a situation, as long as
the territorial restrictions remain, the consumer desire for re-
duced prices or better services will not be a reason for the retailer
to lower prices or to increase services." Moreover, this phenome-
non deprives consumers of the benefits of retailer competition, in
the same product, in terms of prices or services for the purpose
of attracting and retaining consumer patronage.
While this delineation of the problems posed by agreements
isolating geographic markets may be derived from cases under the
United States antitrust provision embodied in section one of the
Sherman Act,'8 it is apposite to any economic unit, such as the
European Economic Community. With respect to the Com-
munity, to the extent that agreements to divide territories pose
problems in choosing which policy to implement at a given mo-
ment under a "competition" analysis, these problems are com-
pounded by the overriding objective of Article 85(1)-the creation
of a common economic unit. This article'9 explores one path that
the Court of Justice has travelled in the difficult struggle to apply
the proscriptions of Article 85(1) to the complex and varied world
of a common market economy.
v. Ets. J. Vervaecke S.P.R.L. 5-69) [1969] 15 Rec. 295, 305, [Recueil de la Jurisprudence
de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communaut6 europkenne)], 8 C.M.L.R. 273, 278 (1969)
(argument of the Advocate-General).
17. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 167 (1967); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
19. The cases discussed in this article are significant to the practicing United States
antitrust lawyer because Community antitrust law is being applied to both United States
owned subsidiaries doing business in the Community and to the parent based in the
United States. The application of Community law and the presence of Community juris-
diction over the actions of the subsidiary are justified under the emerging doctrine of
enterprise entity, Dyestuffs Cases, 11 C.M.L.R. 105 (1972); Continental Can Case Deci-
sion by the Commission, 12 C.M.L.R. D50 (1973). The Advocate-General has argued that
even without the presence of an operating subsidiary a United States based company may
be subject to Community antitrust jurisdiction under the extra-territorial application of
Community law, Continental Can Case, 12 C.M.L.R. 199, 217 (1973).
Arguably, extra-territorial application is permissible under the doctrine of the "ef-
fects principle", see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (1965). Indeed, a United States district court has applied this doctrine to
embrace the extra-territorial agreement among European Steel Manufacturers regarding
marketing of their products in the United States, Consumers Union of the United States
v. Rogers, 352 F.Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).
The problem of judicial imperialism is outside this article's scope. However, it is
important to note the growing tendency of the Community's applying Community anti-
trust rules to foreign (United States) based companies operating through subsidiaries in
the Community and to note the threat of applying Community law to foreign companies
merely because their activities affect either the external or internal trade of the European
Economic Community, see Note, Common Market Antitrust Law: Jurisdiction Imposed
by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163 (1973).
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THE RULE OF REASON
The two conditions of Article 85(1) . . . tend to meet, and it
is a fact that it is not easy to distinguish them. 21
The general prohibition of Article 85(1) has two clauses. The
problem of whether the two clauses have separate purposes and
meanings depends upon the interpretation of the words in the
first clause, "affect trade between Member States", and of the
words in the second clause, "have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." Although
the Court of Justice has indicated that the two clauses may have
distinct meanings, these meanings have not yet been fully devel-
oped. As will be seen, under both clauses the Court has refused
to condemn as void, per se, even the most restrictive exclusive
distributorship agreements. This refusal, based on the theory
that economic factors must be considered, indicates the presence
of the Court's formulation of its own rule of reason.
To approach the development of this rule of reason, one must
place the business objective of absolute territorial protection, 21
present before the Court in the seminal 1966 cases, within the
context of what one publicist 2 has called the Common Market
20. C.J.C.E. 9 juillet 1969 (Vdlk Ets. J. Vervaecke S.P.R.L. 5-69) [1969] 15 Rec.
295, 306, 8 C.M.L.R. 273, 280 (1969) (conclusions of the Advocate-General).
21. Absolute territorial protection insulates the manufacturer's products from intra-
brand (or retailer) competition in a specified territory. Clauses in contractual agreements
between private parties which create varying degrees of protection are as follows: (1) an
exclusive franchise clause-the manufacturer promises to supply only one distributor in
an assigned territory; (2) an exclusive dealing clause-the distributor promises only to
trade the manufacturer's goods in the assigned territory, usually coincident with national
boundaries; (3) a prohibition against re-exportation-the distributor promises not to ex-
port any of the manufacturer's products to other distributors or customers, and the manu-
facturer promises to impose the same clause on his distributors in other territories; and
(4) a prohibition against parallel imports-both the distributor and manufacturer promise
to exercise industrial property rights to prevent importation of the same product from an
outside territory into the protected territory.
Commission Regulation No. 67/67 interprets Article 85(1) and allows a group exemp-
tion in some circumstances, O.J. March 25, 1967. Article 1 of this regulation lists certain
restrictions allowed to be imposed by the manufacturer upon the retailer. By Articles 2(1)
and 2(2) of this regulation no restrictions other than those listed in Article 1 may be
imposed. Because Article 1 does not include a prohibition against re-exportation in its
enumeration, an agreement with this clause is incapable of exemption, C.J.C.E. 9 nov-
embre 1971 (Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA 22-71) [1971] 17 Rec. 949,
11 C.M.L.R. 81 (1972). Merely because an exemption exists for a particular agreement,
however, a presumption that the agreement is invalid under Article 85(1) does not arise.
C.J.C.E. 13 juillet 1966 (Establissments Consten S.A.R.L. et Grundig-Verkaufs-GMBH
v. Commission de Ia Communaut6 Economique Europdenne 56, 58-64) [1966] 12 Rec.
429, 5 C.M.L.R. 418 (1966).
22. Keyser, Territorial Restrictions and Export Prohibitions Under the United
[VOL. XXXIII
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complex. "The Common Market's complex. . . is one of fear of
a resurrection, in whatever form, of trade barriers especially when
they coincide with the geographical territory of the Member
States."2 As a complex, this fear of agreements resuscitating na-
tional lines could engender a possible distinction, between the
same type of agreements, based upon the geographic locus consti-
tuting the protected territory. In and of itself, the creation by
private agreement of barriers to trade along national lines tends
to prevent the unification of the European Economic Com-
munity.24
In 1966, the Court of Justice considered three cases, Italy v.
EEC Council & Commission,25 Establissements Consten S.A. &
Grundig v. EEC Commission,2" and Socit6 Technique Minire
v. Maschinenbau ULM GMBH," in which this complex and its
basis infused the Court's construction of Article 85(1).
In Italy, a member State challenged certain regulations pro-
mulgated under Article 85. These regulations related primarily to
the procedure for obtaining exemptions for vertical distributor-
ship agreements under Article 85(3).18 Italy argued that Article
States and the Common Market Antitrust Laws, 2 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 271 (1964-1965).
23. Id. at 295.
24. See Information Note from the Commission of the European Communities, No.
P-31, (June 1973), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9574 at 9290:
The common market should by now - a few years after the transitional period
- have come to resemble more and more a single market within which people,
goods, services, capital and companies enjoy freedom of movement.
In none of the cases involving exclusive distributorship agreements decided by the
Court of Justice under Article 85(1) has the territorial protection been other than coinci-
dent with national boundaries.
25. C.J.C.E. 13 juillet 1966 (Gouvernement de la Rpublique Italienne v. Conseille
de la Communautd Economique Europdenne 32-65) [19661 12 Rec. 563, 8 C.M.L.R. 39
(1969) (hereinafter cited as Italy).
26. C.J.C.E. 13 juillet 1966 (Etablissements Consten S.A.R.L. et Grundig-Verkaufs-
GMBH v. Commission de la Communaut6 8conomique Europdenne 56-64, 58-64) [1966]
12 Rec. 429, 5 C.M.L.R. 418 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Grundig).
27. C.J.C.E. 30 juin 1966 (Societh Technique Mini~re [L.T.M.] v. Maschinenbau
ULM GMBH [M.B.U.I 56-65) [19661 12 Rec. 337, 5 C.M.L.R. 357 (1966) (hereinafter
cited as Technique).
28. The Treaty of Rome, art. 85(3) provides:
The provisions of paragraph 1 [Article 85(1)] may, however, be declared inapplica-
ble in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispen-
sable to the attainment of these objectives;
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86,25 and only that Article, applied to this type of agreement.
Viewing the issue as whether any vertical agreements granting
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaties at 246.
In Zaphirou, Rule of Reason and Double Jeopardy in European Antitrust Law, 6 TEx.
INT'L L.F. 1 (1970), the author, citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (inter alia), asserts that under the American rule of reason "[t]he
social or economic benefits that are brought about by a particular restrictive agreement
or practice are not taken into account .... " Id. at 5. As conceived, the author asserts
that the rule of reason's "equivalent ... is found in European Community antitrust law,
where it serves a similar purpose." Id. While this writer disagrees with Mr. Zaphirou on
the lack of a harms and benefits balance under the United States rule of reason, see White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), this writer agrees that, as formulated by
Zaphirou, the Court of Justice looks primarily to market position of the parties in deciding
the agreement's validity under Article 85(1), Zaphirou at 6, see note 42 infra and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, the Court is moving towards a consideration of harms and benefits.
See notes 45 and 57 infra.
The scope of Article 85(3), as stated by Zaphirou, is "much wider than would be
justified under the rule of reason." at 7. In Italy, the Advocate-General argued to the Court
that the Commission, in an exemption decision under Article 85(3), should consider a wide
range of economic factors and cited to the Court White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963), 12 Rec. at 613, 8 C.M.L.R. at 61. The Court did not comment on his
position. In Grundig, however, the Advocate-General restated his Italy argument. He
maintained that the economic consequences of the agreement should be examined in toto
and added that such an examination should not be limited to Article 85(3) but should
form part of the inquiry under Article 85(1). Otherwise, he suggested to the Court, Article
85(1) would be applied on the basis of purely theoretical considerations to situations that
a deeper examination would demonstrate do not interfere with competition, Grundig, 12
Rec. at 515, 5 C.M.L.R. at 431. This deeper examination could reveal that the sole reason
for the absolute territorial protection was to allow a producer to enter the market which,
otherwise, he would have been unable to enter. In such a situation, the Advocate General
concluded, the effects of the agreement would be to promote competition. Id. The Court,
however, disspelled this conclusion by maintaining that "[a]lthough competition be-
tween producers is generally more visible than that between distributors of the same
brand, it does not thereby follow that an agreement which tends to restrict the latter
should escape the prohibition of Article 85(1) merely because it might increase the for-
mer." Grundig, 12 Rec. at 496, 5 C.M.L.R. at 473. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
Whatever balancing of harms and benefits that should occur, according to the
Grundig Court, should occur in the Commission's decision whether to exempt the agree-
ment under Article 85(3), Grundig, 12 Rec. at 502-04, 5 C.M.L.R. at 477-79. The possibil-
ity of the Court entering into a balancing under Article 85(3), however, was left open in
Grundig. The Court, concerned with judicial control over Commission judgments, stated
that it would examine the Commission's decisions and required the Commission to set
forth the facts and considerations upon which its decision was based. Grundig, 12 Rec. at
501, 5 C.M.L.R. at 477.
Despite this decision, the Advocate-General has argued to the Court that some con-
sideration of inter-brand benefits versus intra-brand harms resulting from the agreement
should form part of the Court's decisional process under Article 85(1), see text accompany-
ing note 57 infra.
29. The Treaty of Rome, art. 86 provides, in part:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Treaties at 246.
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territorial protection, under any assumed facts, could fall within
Article 85(1), the Court upheld the regulations. It found nothing
in the language of Article 85(1) that limited its application to
horizontal agreements. 30 Rather, it found in the Treaty, the
Preamble and the text a purpose of abolishing barriers to trade
between the States, a purpose which could be frustrated by verti-
cal agreements that created partitions to trade.
While Italy did affirm one purpose of Article 85(1), the Court
did not consider in any detail the meaning of the specific Treaty
language. Rather-here, the Court's method is important-in
terms of the affirmance of the purpose of abolishing trade barriers
between the States, the Court construed Article 85(1) to apply to
vertical agreements by reference to the general objectives of the
Treaty. This method of construction introduces the element of
teleology, i.e., the fact or the character of being directed toward
an end or shaped by a purpose, into the Court of Justice's juris-
prudence. Under this approach, as illustrated by the decision in
Italy, the objects and purposes of the whole Treaty guide the
construction of a particular Article. 3' This method of construction
is present in the other 1966 vertical distributorship cases and
infuses the Court's discussion of the meaning of the specific lan-
30. Italy, 12 Rec. at 593, 8 C.M.L.R. at 64.
31. The Court of Justice's construction of other particular Articles of the Treaty of
Rome has been guided by teleological considerations. See C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF
JUICIAL DECISIONS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 231 (1972) (commenting upon and quoting
from C.J.C.E. 12 juillet 1962 (Gouvernement du royaume des Pays-Bas/Haute Autorile
de la Communautk europ~ene du charbon et de iacier, 9-61) [1962] 8 Rec. 412, 453, 4
C.M.L.R. 59, 88 (1964)).
As a rule, it begins with an examination of the specific text in question. . . . Only
rarely, however, has the Court been satisfied with such a limited perspective. While
proceeding from the specific provisions in question, it is led by the major purposes
of the Treaties. Thus after its textual examination . . . the Court further inquired
into the ratio legis of the provision, to see if its construction "is not at variance with
the objects of the Treaty or whether it can not be refuted by other considerations."
• . . [A]gain and again, the Court has justified its conclusions by reading Com-
munity regulations in the light of Treaty articles, by construing specific Treaty
provisions in terms of major Treaty purposes and, further, by checking its construc-
tion of major Treaty purposes against specific Treaty provisions. This is necessary
because, as the Court puts it, "the provisions of the Treaty form a whole; they
complete and complement each other."
Illustratively, the Court in a far-reaching decision involving the social security rights
of labor in C.J.C.E. 9 d~cembre 1965 (Hessiche Knappscheft/Maison Singer et Fils 44-65)
[19651 11 Rec. 1191, 1199, 5 C.M.L.R. 82, 94 (1966), interpreted Article 52's reference to
migrant workers to include labor in general, a category larger than only migrant workers.
The Court was guided by the Preamble and the objectives of the Treaty in Article 3: the
improving of working conditions of people and increased movement of persons. See
C.J.C.E. 27 octobre 1971 (Rheinmullen Dussedorf/Einfuhr-und Varralsstelle fur Getreide
und Futtermittel 6-71) [19711 17 Rec. 823, 834, 11 C.M.L.R. 401, 422 (1972).
1973]
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guage of Article 85(1) in these cases.
In Grundig one apparent analytical choice before the Court
of Justice, in an appeal from a Commission decision, was which
clause of Article 85(1), the one emphasizing trade between Mem-
ber States or the one emphasizing the object or effect of the
agreement, would be the vehicle for analysing the legality of the
agreement between the German manufacturer, Grundig, and the
French distributor, Consten. Their agreement provided Consten
with absolute territorial protection. Consten agreed to buy Grun-
dig appliances, such as radios, tape recorders and dictating ma-
chines, to the extent of a minimum percentage of the total exports
from Germany to France. Consten agreed to publicize these
Grundig products and further agreed not to sell competing makes
of the types of products which were the subject of the contract.
Consten agreed not to make any delivery, either direct or indirect,
to any other countries from France, and Grundig promised not to
deliver, either directly or indirectly, its products to other dealers
in France. Finally, Grundig bound its retailers in other countries
to the re-exportation prohibition.
Whether this agreement insulating Grundig products in
France from retail, or intra-brand, competition violated the anti-
trust law of the Community was the general question presented
to the Commission and thereafter to the Court. Additionally, the
parties had requested from the Commission an exemption under
Article 85(3).32
The first issue before the Court as to the applicability of
Article 85(1) was whether the Commission had erred by failing to
32. The applicants attacked the Commission's decision refusing them an exemption
under Article 85(3), reprinted at note 28 supra. According to the Advocate-General, the
grounds of attack were, first, that consumers did not share equitably in the assumed
improvements in production and distribution and, second, that, even if they did share,
the absolute territorial protection was not indispensable to obtain the effects of the im-
provement, Grundig, 12 Rec. at 531-32, 5 C.M.L.R. at 445. The Court rejected the attack
of the parties. According to the Court, the thesis advanced by the parties, based on the
necessity to maintain intact all arrangements of the parties in so far as they were capable
of contributing to improvements in production and distribution, was incompatible with
Article 85. The Article, according to the Court, envisaged a comparison of noticeable
objective advantages with the harm to competition. 12 Rec. at 502-03, 5 C.M.L.R. at 478-
79. On the second argument advanced by the parties, the indispensability of the absolute
territorial protection, they argued, inter alia, that without such protection the retailer
would be unable to make advance plans and would be unwilling to service the products
when brought in by consumers for repairs and maintenance. 12 Rec. at 503, S.C.M.L.R.
at 479. The Court rejected these positions for two reasons: first, the risk of commercial
forecasting inheres in all business endeavors and, thus, did not justify special protection;
second, commercial facts demonstrated that retailers not afforded absolute territorial
protection still provided a high degree of customer services. Id.
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take evidence that trade would have been heavier without the
agreement. On this point, the Commission argued to the Court
that trade would be "affected" within the meaning of the first
clause of Article 85(1) if the agreement caused trade to develop
otherwise than it would have.3 The Court, requiring more, stated
that the proper inquiry was whether the agreement was capable
of endangering freedom of trade between member States in a
direction "which could harm the attainment of the objects of a
single market between States."34 The Court did not mention any
of the economic facts of the case in its discussion of the meaning
of "may affect trade." However, if the opinion is read in light of
the subsequent cases, it may be that the application of the "may
affect trade" clause should be read together with the economic
context of Grundig. This economic context will be discussed after
an analysis of the Court's discussion of the "object or effect"
clause.
To the Court, the mere conclusion that trade was "affected"
did not decide whether Article 85(1) was violated by the agree-
ment. The purpose of the finding, the Court said, was to deter-
mine "the pre-eminence of Community law over that of the
States."35 The presence of a violation also required a finding that
the agreement had the prohibited "object or effect". On this
33. Grundig, 12 Rec. at 495, 5 C.M.L.R. at 472. According to the Advocate-General,
the Commission maintained that trade was "affected" within the meaning of Article 85
when it is found that agreements in the field of competition existed and concerned several
member-States. Id. at 520, 5 C.M.L.R. 433-34. This finding, as properly noted by the
Advocate-General, would make the agreement subject to Community, and not national,
law, see text accompanying note 39 infra. The Advocate-General argued, and the Court
accepted, the position that more than the mere existence of an agreement was required.
The reason advanced by the Advocate-General was that, by a comparison of the Dutch,
Italian and German versions, "affect" meant to influence unfavourably. Moreover, that
influence was to be judged by the agreement's reasonably foreseeable consequences in the
market. Id.
34. Grundig, 12 Rec. at 495, 5 C.M.L.R. at 472.
An early commentator upon Article 85(1) anticipated this construction and asserted:
"The express words of the Article . . . limit the incidence of Article 85(1) to agreements
which are likely to affect trade as between Member States. If the agreement only relates
to trade in one of the Member States of the Common Market then the provisions. . . are
inapplicable." A. CAMPBELL, RESTRICTIVE TRADING AGREMNTs IN THE COMMON MARKET 9
(1964).
35. Grundig, 12 Rec. at 495, 5 C.M.L.R. at 472.
According to the Commission, "[tihe common market should by now-a few years
after the end of the transitional period. . . have come to resemble more and more a single
market within which people, goods, services, capital and companies enjoy freedom of
movement." Information Note from the Commission of the European Communities, No.
P-31, (June 1973), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9574 at 9290. Query whether the Commis-
sion's definition of "affect" in Grundig (see note 33 supra) would contribute more to this
goal of the Treaty as expressed by Articles 2 and 3 (see note 2 supra) than the Advocate-
General's.
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point, the narrow issue which the Court addressed was whether
the Commission had erred in failing to take evidence concerning
the agreement's impact on inter-brand competition. The Court
held:
[F]or the purpose of applying Article 85(1), it is superfluous
to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once
it appears that it has the object of restricting, preventing or
distorting competition.38
This broad language can lead to the conclusion that Grundig
represents a per se approach under Article 85(1), tempered at
most by the strength of the territorial protection created by the
agreement. Similarly, the position of the Court of Justice empha-
sizing the "object" of the agreement supports the per se analysis.
Yet, for two reasons, Grundig does not represent a per se rule.
First, economic intra-brand evidence was considered by the Court
in its approach to defining market characteristics. The Court
defined the product market as Grundig products because of the
high differentiation which the products possessed. Second, the
manufacturer, Grundig, possessed a large market share. 37 There-
fore, to focus on this broad Grundig language is to ignore the facts
and the market 'definition which those facts produced. Accord-
ingly, a proper reading of the case should focus on the language
used by the Court to declare void the agreement before it:
[T]he agreement. . . aims at insulating the French market
for Grundig products and maintaining artificially, for prod-
ucts of a very widespread brand, separate national markets
within the Community . *38
This emphasis upon "a very widespread brand" demon-
strates that a view of Grundig which emphasizes solely the broad
"object" language distorts the case. Clearly, the violation of the
"object or effect" clause was the result of the strength of the
producer in the market, the differentiation of the product, and
36. Grundig, 12 Rec. at 496, 5 C.M.L.R. at 473 (emphasis added).
This language leads to a per se standard, under the "object" clause of Article 85(1),
which finds any agreement with absolute territorial protection void thereunder. An early
commentator concluded that to establish "effect" a thorough investigation would be re-
quired, but to establish "object" something less would be required, A. CAMPBELL, RESTRIc-
TIVE TRADING AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMON MARKET 14 (1964). The Court in Technique did
adopt this position, see text accompanying note 44 infra. In recent years, such a clear
separation of the "object" standard from the "effect" standard no longer seems valid.
Indeed, the two standards appear to have merged, see note 55 infra and accompanying
text.
37. Grundig, 12 Rec. at 519, 5 C.M.L.R. at 433.
38. Id. at 497, 5 C.M.L.R. at 474.
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the absolute territorial protection created by the Grundig-
Consten agreement regarding the French Market and by the
Grundig agreements with other retailers, creating absolute terri-
torial protection in other Member States.
Grundig offers a minimal distinction between the roles of the
two clauses of Article 85(1). For Community law to apply, and
inferentially for the Court to have jurisdiction, 39 under the "may
affect trade" clause, the agreement must affect trade within the
Community. This effect is upon the trade between member
States, and, for this reason, this clause can be considered as the
"interstate trade" clause. For the "object or effect" clause to be
violated, the distortion of competition throughout the Com-
munity may be inferred from the presence of a series of manufac-
turer agreements with other retailers in other Member States
similar to the agreement before the Court if the other agreements
create absolute territorial protection within more than one Mem-
ber State. The Grundig decision, however, fails to mention the
difference between the degree of impact necessary for the agree-
ment to create the impact that would "affect" trade in the pro-
hibited manner and produce the "effect" upon competition that
39. See text accompanying note 54 infra. See Note, Common Market Antitrust Law:
Jurisdiction Imposed by Article 85(l) of the Treaty of Rome, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163
(1973).
In Grundig, the Advocate-General refuted an interesting argument about the differ-
ence between "may affect" and "effect". According to him, the Commission had con-
cluded that the "object" of the agreement was to interfere with competition because it
had the aim of freeing Consten from the competition that other wholesalers of Grundig
appliances would offer if the products were available to them. The Advocate-General
pointed out that if regarded objectively, the Commission's position required an examina-
tion of the "effects" within the market. Moreover, the Commission had condemned the
agreement on the basis of effects within the French market only, Grundig, 12 Rec. at 520-
22, 5 C.M.L.R. at 431-33. Thus the Commission's position was that trade had to be
"affected" between member-States, but that the "effects" within the Community could
occur within one member-State. The Advocate-General argued that the whole market had
to be considered because it would be unrealistic to condemn the agreement because of the
lack of intra-brand competition when inter-brand competition could be augmented by the
agreement. Id.
In condemning the agreement the Court first appeared to follow the Commission's
distinction between "may affect" and "effect":
The [agreement before us] . . . results in an insulation of the French market and
allows the imposition for the products in question of prices from which is excluded
all effective competition. In addition, in so far as the efforts of producers to indivi-
dualize their brands in the eyes of the consumer succeed, the effectiveness of com-
petition between producers tends to diminish.
Grundig, 12 Rec. at 497, 5 C.M.L.R. at 474. In its precise holding, however, the Court was
careful to avoid the impression that it had adopted the Commission's distinction. "Since
the agreement thus aims at insulating the French market for Grundig products and main-
taining artifically, for products of a very widespread brand, separate national markets
within the Community, it is therefore such as to distort competition in the Common
Market." Id. (emphasis added).
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is prohibited. Thus, it may be that the economic evidence and
analysis necessary for jurisdiction under the former clause suf-
fices to support a finding that competition, in the latter clause,
is prevented, restricted, or distorted within the Community.
Interestingly, with respect to the evidence which suffices to
show a violation of Article 85(1)'s clauses, the later decisions"
indicate an awareness that in some instances a manufacturer can
enter a market only by an absolute territorial protection agree-
ment. These decisions, contrary to the Advocate-General's
suggestion, indicate that the arguable economic benefit to con-
sumers by increased manufacturer competition in a member
State is important to decide the "inter-state trade" clause re-
sult." Grundig can be read to imply that the evidence necessary
to condemn an agreement is the same for either clause. The later
cases can be read to imply that the analysis under both clauses
is the same. Therefore, the inference is that the two clauses are
indistinguishable.
Moreover, the evidence which the Court in Grundig used to
declare the agreement void included product differentiation, the
existence of other agreements by the same distributor with retail-
ers in other member States, and the degree to which national law
augmented or decreased the protection provided by the litigated
agreement. This evidence implies that the Court of Justice's rule
of reason is concerned more with establishing a certain economic
pattern than with weighing possible harms and benefits within
that pattern. Against this inference is the possible reading of
40. E.g., C.J.C.E. 9 juillet 1969 (V6lk v. Ets. J. Vervaecke S.P.R.L. 5-69) [1969]
15 Rec. 295, 8 C.M.L.R. 273 (1969).
The Commission has recently adopted the position that medium size firms may enter
into certain co-operative practices, upon entering the European Economic Community,
and not violate Article 85(1), Industry, Research and Technology Bulletin, (January 23,
1973), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9546 at 9217. Whether absolute territorial protection will
be allowed these producers, see C.J.C.E. 9 novembre 1971 (Bguelin Import Co. v. G.L.
Import Export SA 22-71) [1971] 17 Rec. 949, 11 C.M.L.R. 81 (1972) (interpreting Com-
mission Regulation No. 67/67 to not exempt any agreement with a clause against re-
exportation), awaits future action by the Commission and by the Court. See note 45 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra. But see A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EURO-
PEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY LAW 282 (1973) (the "inter-state trade" clause is of little
significance since it is unlike the rule of reason formulated by the United States Supreme
Court).
42. The Court seeks to establish the presence of certain economic and legal factors.
The economic factors are chiefly the relative size of the producer in the product market
and the differentiation which the product possesses in that market. The legal factors
include chiefly the degree of absolute territorial protection provided and the presence of
similar agreements running from the same distributor to other retailers in other member-
States. From the Court's stated reasons for condemning the Grundig-Consten agreement,
see note 39 supra, it is clear that the absolute protection present in more than one
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later decisions which, at least as argued by the Advocate-General,
indicates an awareness that more than an establishment of an
economic pattern should be required before the litigated agree-
ment is declared void or valid under Community law. Regardless
of the requisite evidence or analysis under either clause of Article
85(1), the Grundig position - that, when strong parties agree to
absolute territorial protection for a differentiated product, evi-
dence of inter-brand competition is superfluous - should be con-
sidered a valid statement of the law.
The Grundig construction of Article 85(1) is within the con-
ceptual framework enunciated by the Court of Justice in its other
1966 decision, Technique Mini re. The salient factual distinction
between these two cases is that, in the former, absolute territorial
protection was provided by the agreement while, in the latter, less
than absolute territorial protection was provided . 3 Technique
Mini~re was a referral decision, and the Court was, therefore,
asked to give guidance to the national court on the meaning and
purposes of Article 85(1). In its guidance, the Court refused to
condemn per se all exclusive distributorship agreements. Instead,
the Court proferred a broad outline of Article 85(1).
[T]he agreement containing a clause 'granting an exclusive
right of sale' has been concluded between undertakings,
whatever may be their respective positions in the various
stages of the economic process.
Considered on the basis of a series of objective legal or fac-
tual elements, the agreement is such as to lead to a reasona-
ble expectation that it may be able to exercise an influence,
whether direct or indirect, actual or potential, on trade be-
tween member-States capable of hindering the realisation of
a single market among the said States.
In this respect, examination should particularly be
made whether the agreement is capable of partitioning the
Member-State enabled the Court to condemn the agreement. In this decisional process
under Article 85(1), which measures the agreement between a backdrop of certain unde-
sirable consequences for the goal of a single market between the States, the Court's rule
of reason may be compared to the opinion of Justice Douglas in United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
43. As found by the Cour d'Appel de Paris, the distributor, Technique Mini~re,
agreed to receive from the producer the exclusive sales rights to one product for the
territory of France. The agreement, in distinction from the agreement in Grundig, did
allow Technique Mini~re to re-export the product into areas other than the territory for
which it was ". . . principally responsible. Furthermore, any French purchaser would be
able to obtain supplies by parallel imports in other countries of the Common Market."
Technique, 12 Rec. at 341, 5 C.M.L.R. at 358.
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market in certain products between the member-States.
The agreement has either as its object or its effect the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition.
If the sale concession agreement is considered with re-
gard to its object, the finding should result from all or part
of its clauses considered in themselves.
If these conditions are not met, the agreement should
then be considered with regard to its effect to find either that
it prevents or that it restricts or distorts competition to a
noticeable extent.
In this connection, examination should in particular be
made of the severity of the clauses granting the exclusive
right; the nature and quantity of the products which are the
subject matter of the agreement; the positions of the grantor
and concessionaire on the market for the products in ques-
tion; and the number of parties to the agreement or, where
applicable, to other agreements forming a part of a single
series."
From the Court's directive to the national court, it is clear
that under both clauses of Article 85(1) economic analysis is nec-
essary to decide the "may affect" and the "effect" problem of
the litigated agreement. The economic analysis, however, is not
delineated, and questions such as the relevance of the producer's
market share are unanswered. In comparison with Grundig, one
arguable answer to the market share question is that such a deter-
mination is relevant to both the "may affect" and the "effect"
questions. What is interesting is that both Technique and
Grundig leave the suggestion that no economic data is relevant
to deciding the agreement's "object". In Technique, however, the
Court did state that certain economic factors, noticeably those
relevant to the closing of the channels of re-exportation and par-
allel importation, were relevant to a determination of the agree-
ment's "object or its effect".45 It is submitted that the economic
44. Id. at 361-62, 5 C.M.L.R. at 377.
45. Id. at 360, 5 C.M.L.R. at 376. The Court accorded the same weight to various
economic and legal factors which compose the analysis under Article 85(1). This treat-
ment, when the agreement lacked provisions against re-exportation and parallel importa-
tion, suggests that these two factors are not necessary for the agreement to be declared
void by Article 85(2). If this suggestion remains valid, then the possibility of balancing
intra-brand harms within a series of protected territories against inter-brand benefits
within the same territories exists. In this regard, note that the Court required a compari-
son of the state of competition before the agreement with its state following the implemen-
tation of the agreement, Technique, 12 Rec. at 359, 5 C.M.L.R. at 375. Then the Court
stated: "[Iln particular, the alteration ...of competition may be thrown in doubt if
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evidence used to decide "effect" should decide the agreement's
"object" as well. Whether this solution will be adopted is solely
in the realm of speculation. Literally, according to Technique,
however, the agreement's "object" may be found to be in viola-
tion of Article 85(1) even though no economic data is used.
In V6lk v. Vervaecke S.P.R.L. ,1 a 1969 referral decision, the
Court was presented with the opportunity to clarify the "object"
standard. In this case, two parties without market strength en-
tered into an agreement to distribute a small number of washing
machines under an absolute territorial protection agreement
coincident with national boundaries. Except for the fact that the
manufacturer's brand was little known and its market share min-
ute, the V6lk agreement was virtually identical with the agree-
ment presented to the Court in Grundig17 This virtual identity
created the opportunity for the Court to decide that the creation
of absolute territorial protection did not per se violate the "ob-
ject" standard.
The Advocate-General perceived this opportunity and
argued that the per se "object" implications from Grundig and
that the language from Technique should be limited to the eco-
nomic context of those cases." He contended that to find a viola-
tion of the "object" standard, the "examination should reveal a
sufficient degree of harmfulness with regard to competition."
Therefore, he submitted that more than a theoretical injury to
competition should result from the agreement for it to be con-
demned under the "object" standard.
the said agreement appears precisely necessary for the penetration of an undertaking into
an area in which it was not operating." Id. at 360, 5 C.M.L.R. at 375 (emphasis added).
Because Article 85(3), which involves a balancing of the harms and benefits by the Com-
mission with limited review by the Court (see note 28 supra), was not before the Court,
the Court, at least in terms of advice on referral decisions, appears to be incorporating a
United States type of rule of reason (Article 85(3)) into the analysis of Article 85(1). See
Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (holding valid an
exclusive distributorship agreement when it enabled a manufacturer to enter a new mar-
ket dominated by three other concerns).
46. C.J.C.E. 9 juillet 1969 (VSlk v. Ets. J. Vervaecke S.P.R.L. 5-69) [1969] 15 Rec.
295, 8 C.M.L.R. 273 (1969) (hereinafter cited as V6k).
47. In both cases the vertical agreements provided absolute territorial protection
coincident with national boundaries.
48. [F]or Article 85(1) to be applicable, the examination should reveal a
sufficient degree of harmfulness with regard to competition. That amounts to say-
ing that the alteration in competition . . . should be on a certain scale, and there
[on the "object" standard] we are not very far from the "noticeable" restriction,
which [Technique] requires when the agreement is being considered not as to its
object but as to its effects.
15 Rec. at 305-06, 8 C.M.L.R. at 279.
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The Court, however, did not fully exploit this opportunity to
clarify the "object" standard. Instead, it reiterated the broad
standards of the two clauses, including "object or effect", and
stated that both "should be understood by reference to the actual
context in which the agreement" existed.49 This language seems
to imply that the same evidence and analysis that is proper under
the "may affect" clause to find a violation of it could suffice to
find a violation of either the "object" or the "effect" standard.
This implication is present in two subsequent referral decisions
involving vertical agreements under Article 85(1). In S.A. Cadil-
lon v. Firma H~ss, Maschinenbau K.G. ,y the Court of Justice
stated that the agreement not only must affect trade in such a
way as to hinder the realization of the objectives of a single mar-
ket between States, but also must have the object or effect of
preventing competition within the Community. To decide if trade
were affected, the national court was to consider the objective
elements of law and fact surrounding the agreement.5' Similarly,
to decide if the agreement distorted competition, the national
court had to examine the agreement in the actual context in
which it existed.52
This difficulty in separating the standards of the two clauses
of Article 85(1) perhaps underlies the refusal of the Court of Jus-
tice in B~guelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA53 to clearly
separate them analytically in its advice to the national court.
According to the Court:
[A]n exclusive agency agreement is capable of affecting
trade between member-States and may have the effect of
hindering competition where the concessionaire can prevent
parallel imports ...
[Tihe agreement must affect noticeably the trade between
member-States and competition.
[I]n judging whether a contract containing a clause
granting an exclusive sale is justiciable under the Article,
49. Id. at 302, 8 C.M.L.R. at 282.
50. C.J.C.E. 6 mai 1971 (Socidt6 Anonyme Cadillon v. Firma H6ss, Maschinenbau
K.G. 1-71) [19711 17 Rec. 949, 10 C.M.L.R. 420 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Cadillon).
51. 17 Rec. at 356, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8135 at 7542.
52. Id.
53. C.J.C.E. 9 novembre 1971 (B6guelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA 22-
71) [1971] 17 Rec. 949, 11 C.M.L.R. 81 (1972), discussed in 9 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 491
(1972) (hereinafter cited as Bguelin).
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account should be taken of [the economic nexus of the pro-
ducer's agreement with his distributor]. 54
This advice to the national court indicates that the two clauses
of Article 85(1) are separable only as to the role they possess. The
first clause, "inter-state trade", determines justiciability under
Community law. The same factors that would cause the agree-
ment to be justiciable, however, would seem to cause the agree-
ment to be condemned under the "effect" standard. Whether
these economic factors are relevant to the "object" standard is
unclear from the Bfguelin language. However, if the Court
chooses to adopt the Advocate-General's V61k position that more
than a theoretical injury is required under the "object" standard,
the incorporation of an economic analysis under it would follow. 5
Another aspect of the Advocate-General's argument in V5lk
is present in the two subsequent referral decisions of Cadillon and
Bguelin. In V6lk the quantity of goods covered by the agreement
was quite small. The producer was not well known and the prod-
uct was treated by the Advocate-General as if it lacked market
differentiation." Because of this, he argued to the Court that the
manufacturer's market share was important to the determination
of whether the "object or effect" clause of Article 85(1) was vio-
lated. The Court agreed that market share was important, albeit
54. 17 Rec. at 960, 11 C.M.L.R. at 96.
55. The Court stated: "[T]he agreement must affect noticeably the trade between
member-States and competition." The use of the word "noticeably" is significant. In Vo6lk
the Advocate-General urged that the "object" standard was close to the "effect" standard,
see note 48 supra. In &guelin, the Advocate-General maintained that agreements are
prohibited by Article 85(1) when they "have the object or effect of noticeably preventing,
restricting or distorting competition within the Common Market." Bkguelin, 17 Rec. at
967-68, 11 C.M.L.R. at 89 (emphasis added). An analysis emphasizing the recurrence of
"noticeably" in the discussion of the disjunctive "object or effect" clause leads to the
conclusion that the standards under these two clauses have merged. This conclusion leads
to the judgment that the Technique distinction of "object" from "effect" - when absolute
territorial protection is provided, there is no need to look at effects; when less than
absolute territorial protection is provided, effects must be viewed - has been abandoned.
A contrary argument, however, exists. Bkguelin's facts did not establish whether
absolute territorial protection was provided by the agreement, Id. at 965, 11 C.M.L.R. at
86. Therefore the Court was not overruling the Technique framework. This argument,
however, ignores the analysis by the Court in Grundig of market effects even though the
agreement in that case provided absolute territorial protection, see notes 37-38 supra and
accompanying text.
56. The Advocate-General argued:
[Tihe Grundig judgment took particular account of the fact that the trademark
was very widespread in judging the influence on the functioning of competition in
the Common Market. . . . It may be concluded from this that an agreement of
the same nature but relating to products bearing a practically unknown trademark
would not have received from you the same judgment and the same severity.
V61k, 15 Rec. at 306, 8 C.M.L.R. at 280.
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important to determine a violation of the "inter-state trade"
clause. Therefore, the reasoning behind the Advocate-General's
suggestion may be relevant to the future development of the
Court's rule of reason. The Advocate-General contended that,
with a large producer, competition would be affected noticeably
at the distributor level if the agreement provided absolute terri-
torial protection. With a small producer, the Advocate-General
was unsure of such an agreement's impact. He considered that
the producer would be able to enter the market, which was desira-
ble, but he did not think the agreement would reduce the con-
sumer's choice of products. Moreover, he argued that with a small
market share held by the producer, the ability of other producers
to enter the protected territory would be unimpaired.57 The impli-
cation from this argument, on one level, is that there should not
be a per se "object" standard under Article 85 (1). On a more
fundamental level, the Advocate-General was arguing for incor-
poration of a harms and benefits analysis and factual inquiry into
the Grundig formulation of the rule of reason.5"
In Cadillon, the German manufacturer, Hass, had granted
the French distributor, Cadillon, the exclusive right to sell H6ss
cement hoppers and containers in France. The deal was renego-
tiated and in addition to the exclusive distributorship rights pro-
57. Id. This reflects a balance of intra-brand harms and inter-brand benefits similar
to that suggested by the United States Supreme Court in White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) and applied by the Sixth Circuit in Sandura Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), see text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
In Grundig, the Court held that the Commission need not consider evidence of inter-brand
competition in formulating its decision, see text accompanying note 36 supra. Yet, in
discussing whether the "effects" of an agreement within the geographic market of one
member-State sufficed to condemn the agreement, see note 39 supra, the Court did con-
sider the harms and benefits to competition and decided that preferring inter-brand
competition at the cost of absolute territorial protection would not comport with Article
85(1). The Court reasoned that producer competition would be best stimulated by "com-
petition between distributors of products of the same brand." Grundig, 12 Rec. at 497, 5
C.M.L.R. at 474. In Technique, however, the Court did advise the national court to
consider the new entrant to the market at the producer level somewhat more specially,
presumably on the rationale that in such a situation, if absolute territorial protection were
precisely necessary for entry, the inter-brand benefits would outweigh the loss of intra-
brand competition, see note 45 supra. Unless the Court is distinguishing review of Com-
mission decisions (Grundig) from advice on referral decisions (Technique) it appears that
under Article 85(1) a harms and benefits legal hypothesis already exists.
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. As formulated in note 57 supra, a
balance of harms and benefits under Article 85(1) currently exists as a legal hypothesis
in the Court's construction of the provisions of the Article. The argument of the Advocate-
General in V61k appears to go beyond this and to seek a factual examination of each case
under a harms and benefits analysis. If this were accepted by the Court, query the role of
Article 85(3) as discussed in note 28 supra.
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vision, the agreement provided that the quantity of products to
be distributed would be thirty per year. Subsequently, H6ss re-
neged, Cadillon brought suit in a national court, and H6ss de-
fended on the ground that the agreement violated Article 85(1).
In addition to advising the national court in the V6Ik rubric about
the meaning, purposes and standards of the two clauses, the
Court advised the national court to consider if Commission Regu-
lation No. 67/67 exempted the agreement. The Advocate-General
had cautioned against this. He argued that even if the turnover
of goods under the agreement was of de minimis dollar value, the
product market might be so specialized that the agreement could
come within the prohibitions of Article 85(1).19 The thrust of his
position is that V6lk should not be used to establish a per se
exemption from the Article for weak parties with small volume
agreements.
The Advocate-General reiterated this argument in B~guelin.
In this referral case, two separate commercial companies in two
different member States possessed exclusive agency agreements
with a manufacturer in a non-member State. The vertical aspects
of the agreements provided the retailers with absolute terri-
torial protection. When a third party distributor sought to export
the same product into France, one of the protected territories, the
aggrieved distributor sought to have the exportation enjoined.
The defendant, third party distributor, asserted that the agree-
ment violated Article 85(1). The Advocate-General maintained
that even if the agreement were of a slight product volume signifi-
cance and even if the parties were of medium size or smaller, the
special characteristics of the product market might cause the
agreement to be prohibited by Article 85(1). The Court, in advis-
ing the national court, did not find it necessary to comment on
this point. Instead, as mentioned earlier, the Court reiterated the
Vlk rubric.
The position of the Court in V6Ik, Cadillon and Bkguelin has
59. Cadillon, 17 Rec. at 361, 10 C.M.L.R. at __, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8135
at 7546.
The Commission has by an announcement considered that agreements which relate
to a very small undertaking will not fall under Article 85(1). This may be considered as a
'statutory' form of a de minimis rule, supplementing the judicially developed 'rule of
reason' which is broader than the Commission's formulation.
If the product is less than five per cent of the market or when the total turnover
under the agreement is less than 15 million units of account, the de minimis principle
as formulated by the Commission exempts the agreements from the operation of the
antitrust provisions. O.J., 2 June 1970, No. C 64/1, recently amended by Regulation
2591/72 of December 1972.
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been consistent, but has not dealt with the arguments of the
Advocate-General. In V61k, the Advocate-General maintained
that if the parties are weak and their product lacks differentia-
tion, their agreement, even if it provides absolute territorial pro-
tection, should not be declared void under Article 85(1) without
some balancing of the harms and benefits that would arise upon
the producer's entry into the market. In Cadillon and B6guelin,
the Advocate-General maintained that even without absolute
territorial protection, the Court should consider an agreement
providing for distribution of a differentiated product to be within
the prohibition of Article 85(1).
Taken together with the decisions of the Court of Justice
in 1966, these positions of the Advocate-General provide a cer-
tain symmetry. In Grundig, the result of condemnation of an
absolute territorial protection agreement between strong parties
with a differentiated product is symmetrical with V61k, which
indicates that an absolute territorial protection agreement be-
tween weak parties with a non-differentiated product should not
be declared void. The decisions in these two cases appear to de-
pend upon an examination of the economic context of the agree-
ment and the product. For this reason, perhaps, the Advocate-
General has maintained that Grundig was a special case 0 and
that it should not be used to condemn per se all agreements which
provide absolute territorial protection. Similarly, by his product
differentiation arguments in the weak distributor-weak product
context of Cadillon and Bguelin, the Advocate-General has
cautioned against V61k being used as a per se exemption.6
Whether this symmetry will be accepted by the Court is a ques-
tion whose answer will come only at a future date.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has inter-
preted Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome in light of the Treaty's
objectives of fostering a Common Market and ensuring competi-
60. See note 56 supra.
61. V61k would be used as a per se exemption if it were thought that a small turnover
of goods under the agreement made it incapable of "affecting" trade. As argued by the
Advocate-General.
it is perfectly possible for an agreement, even when it bears on small quantities of
products and even when it is concluded between small and medium-sized undertak-
ings, to fall under Article 85 of the Treaty by reason of the special characteristics
of the markets in the products in question.
B~guelin, 17 Rec. at 968, 11 C.M.L.R. at 90.
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tion therein. Competition, as defined by the Commission of the
European Communities, is "a single market within which people,
goods, services, capital and companies enjoy freedom of move-
ment. 12 This definition presupposes a broader vision than that
of an exclusive distributorship agreement insulating a market
along national boundary lines. An interesting problem, therefore,
could arise when an agreement absolutely protects a territory not
coincidental with national boundaries.
Aside from this problem, the decisions of the Court of Justice
do indicate the formulation of a rule of reason. This rule, as
presently formulated by the Grundig decision, considers vertical
distributorship agreements in the light of certain economic fac-
tors. The rule, as developed by the decisions, generally does not
balance harms and benefits. Instead, the rule seeks to establish
certain economic results of the agreement which are then used to
declare it void or valid. In tension with this formulation is the
thrust of the Advocate-General's arguments in V6lk. While ac-
cepting the economic context, this position requires some balanc-
ing of the benefit of a new producer in a market against the harm
to competition throughout the Community.
As formulated by Court decision, the meaning, purposes and
standards of "may affect" in the first clause and "effect" in the
second clause of Article 85(1) are basically identical. A current
62. Information Note from the Commission of the European Communities, No. P-
31 (June 1973), CCH COMM. MKT. RrR. 1 9574 at 9290.
63. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not list the
jurisprudence of a supranational court, such as the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, or even its own jurisprudence, as a source of international law. This should
not prevent a consideration of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice as a source of
international law. Otherwise, neither would the case law of the existing world court be
considered a source of international law. See generally, Scheingold, The Court of Justice
of the European Communities and the Development of International Law, 59 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROCEEDING 190 (1965); Hay, The Contribution of the European Communities to
International Law, Id. at 195. 199.
Assuming the validity of using the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities as a source of international law, under an inductive approach to interna-
tional law the rules of interpretation that may be adduced from the Court's cases are
considered as sources of new rules of international law. Without arguing the point, the
proposition does exist that the process of reasoning advanced by the Court of Justice is
one that may be followed by future courts such as the one in the East African Common
Market. It is not suggested that this development in any sense will have a direct bearing
on the work of future supranational or regional courts, or existing international courts. It
is suggested that the Court of Justice's rule of reason is a jurisprudential development that
merits consideration by these other courts as a viable and flexible approach to interpreting
treaty provisions of an economic nature. Thus, while the Court of Justice's rule of reason
is by no means fully developed, the existing development holds lessons for European and
international lawyers.
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problem is the question of the necessity for economic evidence
under the "object" standard of the second clause. The movement
of the decisions seems to indicate that this evidence will be re-
quired.
Regardless of these problems, which await a case by case
solution, the Court of Justice has decided that complex matters
of economics and trade cannot be decided in the abstract vacuum
of the words of Article 85(1). This decision is welcome.
